STALEMATE IN ITALY

To understand why Operation Sunrise and a German surrender in Northern Italy were important, one must first examine the military and political situation existing in the region near the end of the war. The entire Italian campaign had been disastrous; after eighteen months of fighting in March 1945 there had been nearly 300,000 Allied casualties. The Anglo-American penetration of the Mediterranean was made in a series of badly coordinated steps as British and American political priorities often differed. The British government was looking for military opportunities within a political framework, hoping that openings of communication with the Mediterranean would allow for the return of British influence. Conversely, the United States viewed the Mediterranean as merely an exercise ground, while the battlefront was located across the English Channel.

The battle in the Mediterranean was a futile military half measure. The cross-channel invasion was the top-priority for America, but Churchill refused to abandon his desire for a separate peace with Italy. A compromise was made allowing Supreme Allied Commander Dwight Eisenhower to decide whether or not to invade the mainland after Sicily had fallen. In July 1943 after Sicily was under complete Anglo-American control and Mussolini had been forced to resign, the Allies refused to enter into negotiations with Badoglio, the new head of government. The Allies held to their demand for an unconditional surrender and were thus willing to let the country be occupied by the Germans. It was only after two months of German occupation that Allied forces decided to make modest invasions of Italy. Germans gave up some ground, but the casualties were large and campaigns were stalemated. Once the Allies conquered areas of Italy, they then had the responsibility of governing these destructed areas. With no agreement between Allies of how to fight in Italy, there was also no clear understanding of how to govern the country. Thus, the Anglo-American military did as little as possible in an effort to give the impression that they would not be there long.

With the fall of Mussolini, anti-Fascist parties reorganized themselves and partisan groups increased. The Combined Chiefs of Staff were unwilling to assist civilians who had been affected by economic and social problems. Inactivity was due to the belief of the United States that Germany would be defeated in central Europe; thus, Italy was not vital for an Allied victory. In German-occupied areas in Italy, most of the power was held by the SS and German police. SS-Obergruppenfuhrer Karl Wolff, who would eventually play a significant role in Operation Sunrise, controlled the German police, the Gestapo, the intelligence and counterintelligence forces of the SD, and units engaged against the partisans. German occupation was a nightmare as they seized and exploited Italian resources. As a result, many Italians turned to the Anglo-American lead and waited for an Allied victory.

Despite heavy losses in the spring and summer of 1944, the Germans led by Kesselring believed that the Allied forces were nearly spent and that the Germans would eventually be able to hold. After seven Allied divisions were removed from Italy to fight in the Second Front, the German resistance grew even more in the fall of 1944. At this point Churchill and Roosevelt agreed to not send any new troops into the region, as fresh troops were needed in France.

One of the possible sources of assistance for the Allies were the Italian people involved in partisan movements. Although the Allied governments had ignored the resistance movements, Allen Dulles of the OSS and John McCaffery of the British SOE had met with two partisan leaders in Switzerland in 1943. Through these early contacts, the OSS and SOE received important intelligence information and came to trust some of the resistance leaders as mediators between Communist and anti-Communist bands. Although the Soviets were not directly involved in Italy, they had an indirect influence in the Communist party. Western powers maintained the fear that the Russians might use their growing strength to attempt a Communist takeover. Although the role of the OSS was still minimal at this point, the SOE sought to maintain close relations with the resistance movement and get political control over it. By mid-1944 the OSS was putting together a strong partisan support in Northern Italy. They flooded partisan ranks with new recruits and gradually increased the intensity and scale of operations. However, partisans were spread out too far to effectively function on their own. But the Italians received much fewer supplies than the Yugoslavs, and by the fall and winter of 1944-45, the Italian resistance movement was struggling. Despite requests by Dulles for strong aid to the partisans, few Allied drops were made. As the Axis anti-partisan campaign took effect, Italians were under significant punishment. Simultaneously Alexander, the British General in Italy, was ordered to send more and more troops to Eisenhower north of the Alps. For the rest of the winter, Alexander had to fool the Germans into thinking that there were more Allied forces in the area by making his limited divisions make appearances in diverse locations. When the Allies defeated the Germans in central Europe, there was an uneasiness regarding the situation in Italy. The German forces could make either a suicidal last stand in the Alps or leave northern Italy in a state of anarchy or under Communist control. As other Generals were about to end the war in central Europe, Alexander was left with nothing to show for an Italian campaign that would likely end in a stalemate, and the Allies would be left with the task of trying to rebuild or maintain peace in postwar northern Italy.

Sources:

Absalom, Roger. "Hiding History: The Allies, the Resistance and the Others in Occupied Italy 1943-1945". The Historical Journal no. 38 (1995): 111-131.

Smith, Bradley F. & Agarossi, Elena. Operation Sunrise: The Secret Surrender. New York: Basic Books, 1979.