MAKING CONTACT WITH THE OSS

The Nazi forces were operating under two major themes in 1945, avoiding a postwar situation similar to the First World War and keeping the oath of loyalty to Hitler. Many German generals, including Field Marshall Kesselring, repeatedly dismissed the idea of making a secret deal with the Allies simply because Hitler was still alive. General Vietinghoff, Kesselring’s successor, was willing to go a bit further in considering a secret surrender, but he feared that troops would disobey any command of capitulation that would directly contradict Hitler’s orders. Until the collapse of the Third Reich was apparent to the people themselves, the general was unwilling to move forward with a surrender.

As late as March and April, Kesselring and Wolff still held to the hope that a German miracle was possible. The attempted assassination of Hitler intensified the terror as all opponents were now being traced down. German thinking tended to ignore their huge defeats and cling to a faith in the Fuhrer and ultimate victory. Hitler continued to voice his prophecy that the East-West alliance would eventually break apart.

Despite Hitler’s push to keep fighting, by February 1945 surrender approaches by German officers in Venice, the men of Monte Rosa, and Czech SS troops had been made to the OSS. Only one approach emerged as significantly affecting the end of the war, the contact made by SS Obergroppenfuhrer Karl Wolff. At the time of his contact, Wolff was Higher SS and Political Leader in Italy and was responsible for the struggle against the Italian partisans. Wolff had been close to Hitler, and his SS units tortured hostages and destroyed towns. Although his actions were inhumane by military and police standards, in comparison to what had taken place in Germany, his actions in Italy were ironically considered moderate.

Wolff wanted to arrange a contact with the Allies, as he saw it as an opportunity to help split the Allied coalition and make a deal between the Western powers and the Nazis. Hitler had implicitly consented to contacts being made by Wolff to split the alliance. Wolff still had to be cautious in making contacts as they would make him vulnerable to being accused of betraying the Reich. To initiate contact Wolff hired an Italian businessman, Baron Luigi Parrilli, who had a number of connections to SS officials in Italy. In February Parrilli went to Switzerland to talk to Gero von Schulze Gaevernitz, a German-American OSS man and one of Dulles’ collaborators. Gaevernitz sent him away with the message that only a talk with Dollmann, Wolff, or Kesselring would be worth his time. At this point the incident was thought to be closed.

On March 2 Wolff sent Dollmann and Zimmer to Switzerland. Conflicting assumptions have been made regarding Wolff’s intentions at this point. Was he really looking to make a deal at this point? Sending two SS officers to secretly surrender would have triggered denunciation by Nazis. In his mind, Wolff still held on to the belief that the East-West alliance was going to split and the Western powers would join with the Nazi Germans to fight the Soviets. Early in the game Wolff was not looking to risk treason; rather, he was trying to ingratiate himself with Western powers.  

Source:

Smith, Bradley F. & Agarossi, Elena. Operation Sunrise: The Secret Surrender. New York: Basic Books, 1979.