Prolonging the Bern Talks
Considering the unlikelihood of surrender, it is surprising that Dulles prolonged the Bern affair. Dulles was so enticed with the game that he failed to end the operation. He did not realize that as the Allies continued to advance, Sunrise was not as important. The failure of OSS authorities to control Dulles led to his ability to keep the possibility of the operation open.
On April 9, Wolff sent Dulles 2 memorandums, the first stating the efforts that would be made by the Germans and the second requesting concessions from the Allies. He also wanted a written advanced copy of the surrender terms. Dulles responded the following day and refused an advanced copy. On April 14 the British recommended cutting off the talks as there was no hope. Between April 15 and April 21 continued contact between Dulles and Wolff heightened the possibility of surrender.
However, on April 21 Dulles was ordered by the Combined Chiefs to cut the Sunrise contact. Since Wolff was already on his way to Switzerland, Dulles said there was nothing he could do to prevent him from coming. Although Dulles would not see Wolff, he would seek intelligence via intermediaries. In the meantime, the Allies achieved decisive military victories from the 23rd to the 25th. Dulles still tried to convince the authorities that Sunrise talks were favorable.
In an effort to reach Dulles, Wolff became trapped in Como as roads had been seized by partisans. He was then rescued by his Swiss and American partners in Sunrise. These men were so concerned with personal victories that they failed to serve the obligations of their own governments. On April 27, Dulles and his men successfully rescued Wolff, thus putting him in their debt. By this date a German surrender was no longer significant as partisans had seized control without major destruction or disorder. The original reasons for surrender were no longer relevant.
Source:
Smith, Bradley F. & Agarossi, Elena. Operation Sunrise: The Secret Surrender. New York: Basic Books, 1979.