Angry Soviets Respond

Throughout the course of the war, territorial problems were not settled between the Soviets and Western Allies. Their alliance was held together by a common fear of Nazi Germany rather than by a trusting relationship between the East and West. As the Russians had suffered the heaviest losses, Stalin wanted recognition for their wartime sacrifices. In March 1945 after driving back German forces on the Eastern front for over 2 ½ years, the Red Army’s advance was slowed in Berlin. Rather, it was the Western Allies who grabbed victory from the Germans, seeming unfair to the Soviets. Once they heard of the Bern talks, the Russians again saw themselves threatened.

In response to the Secretary Stemson’s letter sent to Moscow on March 20, Molotov dispatched a reply on March 23 that was angered with suspicion and accusation. The Russians felt that what happened at Bern was not a misunderstanding at all, but rather a stab in the back to the Soviet Union, as they had carried out most of the burden of the war against Germany. Thus, Molotov demanded that the talks be broken off with the Germans. Initially the British did not respond to the letter as they stalled and kept silent. On March 25, Clark Kerr, the British Ambassador in Moscow, sent a telegram indicating that the Western Allies needed to keep the Soviets informed of developments by telling them everything that was discussed on the March 19 meeting with Wolff in Bern. On April 2 a letter, which tried to put the best possible image on Western actions, was sent from Alexander to the Soviet military chiefs.

While the British stalled in making a response, three secret letters were sent from Roosevelt to Moscow on March 24, March 31, and April 4. Three replies were thus sent from Moscow on March 29, April 3, and April 7. The letters from Roosevelt were actually written by Admiral Leahy, with help from Stimson and General Marshall. Roosevelt added a few words here and there and then approved the final draft. The first letter failed to make any impression on the Soviet leaders, as they emphasized that negotiations would lead to an opening of the Western front, which would shift German forces to the East. The second letter from the United States assured Stalin that no negotiations had taken place. This again did nothing to ease Stalin’s anger as he made yet another angry reply. The third letter written by Leahy defended what had taken place at Bern. Stalin responded again with a letter that again reiterated his stance that it was not just a military matter, but his tone showed more reassuring signs as he stated that he did not wish to blacken anyone. A final response was made by the United States, which declared that the Bern talks had faded into the past.

Sources:

Smith, Bradley F. & Agarossi, Elena. Operation Sunrise: The Secret Surrender. New York: Basic Books, 1979.

Smith, Bradley F. The Shadow Warriors: The O.S.S. and the Origins of the C.I.A. New York: Basic Books, 1983.

Smith, R. Harris. OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972.