MARCH TALKS BETWEEN DULLES AND WOLFF

While debate continued regarding Soviet involvement, Dulles and Wolff continued their discussions. On March 13, Dulles learned from Wolff via the Italian intermediary, Baron Parrilli, that Kesselring had left Italy for Berlin on a direct order from Hitler. Deputy chief of the SS, Ernst Kaltenbrunner, had also learned of Wolff’s trip to Switzerland. He warned him to break off his contacts, as he was jeopordizing Kaltenbrunner’s own attempts to work with the Allies. Competition was emerging as to who could make the best contact with the Allies. In the meantime Dulles sent Parrilli to find out what Wolff now intended to do. On March 15, Wolff informed Dulles via Parrilli that if Kesselring did not come back he would either work out a deal by himself or with Kesselring’s successor.

While Wolff and Dulles communicated via long-distance exchanges, Alexander was making decisions in Caserta. On March 12, the Combined Chiefs of Staff told Alexander that he could send military representatives to Bern but that these men were not to contact the Germans until further instruction was given. Alexander chose British chief intelligence officer, General Terrance Airey, and his American deputy chief of staff, General Lyman Lemnitzer. On March 13, Airey and Lemnitzer left Caserta and met Dulles two days later in the French border town of Annemasse. Having come this far, Airey and Lemnitzer wanted to still meet in Bern despite the uncertainty surrounding Wolff. Dulles sent Parrilli to Wolff’s headquarters with a message that requested his presence in Switzerland for another set of talks.

On March 19, Dulles, Wolff, Gaevernitz, Airey, and Lemnitzer met near Ascona. Wolff did not provide any direct answers regarding surrender. He stated that Kesselring’s replacement, General von Vietinghoff, was probably not going to participate in the plan so his best hope would be to go directly to Kesselring. At this point the Allies were hopeful that Wolff would come up with a general plan and accepted that he had actually made further arrangements with Kesselring. In reality Kesselring had no involvement in Wolff’s plans. Wolff had also created the impression that he had joined with the Western Allies in a common effort to produce peace. Both the Allies and Wolff were not exactly sure of what to expect or what the other side’s intentions were. Wolff may have had the advantage but he really had no idea what his deal would consist of or what the German authorities would think of it. Wolff tried to delay an Allied offensive in Italy, hoping he would first work his way into their confidence and also have some role in the postwar situation. By March 21, Wolff’s optimism and likely surrender had reached the top of Anglo-American command. The Western Allies had made themselves vulnerable to Soviet suspicion, as they were negotiating with Wolff while still contending that no negotiations had been taking place.

Source:

Smith, Bradley F. & Agarossi, Elena. Operation Sunrise: The Secret Surrender. New York: Basic Books, 1979.