INFORMING THE SOVIET UNION

British Field Marshall Alexander was especially susceptible to the Sunrise enthusiasm because he knew that the Germans still had a powerful force in Italy. He proposed to follow Dulles’s advice to send military representatives to Switzerland to verify the German’s readiness to surrender before going to Caserta for a formal capitulation. The British Chiefs in London advised Alexander to inform the Soviets of the situation. Churchill agreed and instructed Alexander not to send representatives until authorized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to do so because the Soviets needed to be informed prior to any meetings taking place.

Although the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed with the British Chiefs that the Soviets needed to be informed, the Americans were anxious about asking the Soviets as it could possibly delay the success of Sunrise. On March 11 Roosevelt was notified of Churchill’s approval of the decision to inform the Soviets, and thus also agreed to informing them before proceeding. When the decision was made to inform the Soviets, Churchill took the initiative to alter the original policy that had been set forth by the Combined Chiefs of Staff. Not only did the British message to Moscow notify the Soviets of surrender overtures, but it also requested Soviet opinion. Following receipt of their views, Churchill indicated that the Western powers would then take them into consideration. Although this was an independent action taken by Churchill, he was correct in expressing his concern over the fact that the Soviets would be suspicious of anything that appeared to have been a separate peace discussion. He wanted to avoid friction with the Soviets but he also provided them with an opportunity to impose conditions that could jeopardize negotiations and cause inter-Allied conflict.

On March 12 a reply was received from Molotov indicating that the Russian government considered the conversations important and designated three Soviet officers to participate in the Bern talks. Molotov then requested assistance getting his officers into Switzerland since the two countries did not have diplomatic relations. The British and Americans had different reactions to the Soviet reply. While the British Joint Staff asked the Combined Chiefs to direct Alexander to get the officers to Bern, the American government was not willing to follow the British recommendation. However, the Combined Chiefs had been preempted by the British and the Americans had gone along, but they were not happy with the decision, particularly Secretary of War Stimson. He felt that the whole affair would cause delay and even more importantly lead to trouble in Allied relations. The Americans felt that there was no justification for Soviet involvement, as the Bern talks were concerned with the Anglo-American front and the Soviets thus had no legitimate military authority or interest in the matter. The United States ambassador in Moscow, Averall Harriman, felt that if the Western powers accepted Molotov’s demand, it would hinder relations and lead to even more intolerable demands put forth in the future. The head of the American Military Mission, General John Deane, also disapproved of the Soviet request for participation in negotiations. He felt that from a military perspective it was the America’s decision. Although Deane stressed military necessity, he also came to the political conclusion that it would not be favorable for the United States in future negotiations. The State and War Departments as well as the president discussed the issue and came to the conclusion that a complete refusal would have adverse effects on relations. However, they also expressed the concern that the mere presence of Soviet officers might also have a negative effect on the willingness of the Germans to surrender. Thus, the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommended that Alexander begin talks with the Germans in Bern and inform the Soviets that they would not be present but that they would be welcome at subsequent meetings. On March 14 this recommendation was sent to the British, but Churchill reacted with hostility and said that the Soviets had nothing to do with a pure military surrender of the German army in Italy. The British revised the American proposal, adapting themselves to Churchill’s stance and using harsher language.

As a response, the Soviets reacted strongly to the stringent Anglo-American position. Molotov sent a response on March 16 condemning the Western refusal to admit Soviet representatives to the Bern talks. Molotov insisted that the talks be broken off and any future separate negotiations by one or two of the Allied powers with German representatives without the participation of the third Allied power be ruled out.

The Soviet worry and anger over the Bern affair accelerated after the arrival of a message from Field Marshall Alexander to the Soviet general staff on March 17. Alexander had not been informed that the Soviets had demanded an end to the Bern talks. He was also unaware than the Western Allies were basing their arguments on the fact that these were not negotiations but rather preparatory talks. Alexander’s letter to the Soviets indicated that their representatives were encouraged to come to his headquarters if the negotiations in Bern were successful. Thus, two contradictory messages arrived in Moscow, one indicating that there were no negotiations taking place and the other admitting to them.

The intermediaries who had a tremendous and surprising impact on the sending of letters were Generals Deane and Archer. Both men knew about Molotov’s original letter demanding an end to the talks, yet they decided to send Alexander’s letter as if they were unaware of Molotov’s demand. Soviet General Antonov replied to the letter stating that it must have been based on a misunderstanding. However, this reply was not relayed back to Alexander by Deane and Archer, since they believed that he was uninformed about the Soviet insistence that the Bern negotiations be broken off. These decisions made by Deane and Archer show how inept the Allies were at handling exchanges and how they easily supplied the Soviets with information that would give cause for concern.

In an attempt to alleviate the problem, Washington gave the military authorities the task of responding to General Antonov. Secretary of War Stimson replied that the incident had been a misunderstanding and that the American contention was that it was not a political matter but rather one of military adherence. On March 20 this message was sent to Moscow.

From March 11 to March 19, East-West relations had become tense. Not only were Soviets upset by the decision to hold negotiations without them in Bern, but they were also growing aware of the possible implications of a large German surrender in Italy. While the Soviets were fighting under tough circumstances on the Eastern front, the Western powers were sweeping over areas in central Europe. Surrender in northern Italy would lead to Anglo-American occupation of areas intended for the Soviets.

Sources:

Smith, Bradley F. & Agarossi, Elena. Operation Sunrise: The Secret Surrender. New York: Basic Books, 1979.

Smith, R. Harris. OSS: The Secret History of America's First Central Intelligence Agency. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1972.