ALLEN DULLES

 

Once Wolff left for Switzerland on March 8, Dulles could no longer work through secondary agents to communicate. By telling the Germans that the OSS was willing to talk and by making the release of Parri and Usmiani a precondition of serious intent, Dulles’ actions directly caused Wolff to make the trip to Switzerland.

Dulles was strongly committed to the idea that an organization dedicated to intelligence-gathering and covert operations could make possible a quick end to the war. By early 1945, the most aspiring covert OSS operation remaining was Italian partisan support. Dulles strongly advised partisan support in Italy to counter Soviet prestige in the country. Thus, his goal was to fortify anti-Communist groups and convince Italians that the Western powers were on their side. Dulles also believed countering Soviet influence involved giving German authorities some sense of hope for the future; thus, causing opposition within the Party, which would lead to an early capitulation.

Despite Dulles’s wishes, he was not authorized by the Allies to offer concessions to top Nazi or Fascist officials. The policies had to follow the principles of military necessity and unconditional surrender. Another problem was that much of the OSS intelligence pertaining to the Third Reich in February and March 1945 was out of date. While Allied leaders were skeptical of the SS, Dulles viewed the SS more positively and thus felt that they had the necessary power to carry out capitulation. Despite these beliefs, the SS could only support capitulation, but it was only the German army who had the power to carry one out. Dulles underestimated the political risks involved in dealing with SS representatives or secondary Nazi leaders. An inherent difficulty was that if Axis powers gained the confidence of individual Allied officials, there was the possibility that peace terms would be softened before or after capitulation. Even more dangerous was the fact that Soviets were not involved in talks between the OSS and Germans. This led to the belief that a Nazi-Western deal was being made behind Soviet backs. This could cause a break in East-West relations, which would be favorable to the Germans. 

Rather than focusing on these political risks, Dulles was primarily concerned with the technicalities. Secrecy was of utmost importance to avoid betrayal. He arranged contacts in Switzerland, as he had experience in getting officials into the country without arousing suspicion. Dulles narrowly focused on the practical operations and his own interests. Since the OSS had achieved minimally in Europe compared to the British code-breaking successes of Ultra, this was his chance to gain an accomplishment. When he received word on March 8 that Parri and Usmiani had been released, he considered it to be a Sunrise, not only for the Allied cause, but also for his mission and that of the OSS.

Source:

Smith, Bradley F. & Agarossi, Elena. Operation Sunrise: The Secret Surrender. New York: Basic Books, 1979.