In the interim of the two London Naval Conferences, Yamamoto commanded the First Air Fleet and later "became head of the technical arm of the navy" (Potter 23). Combined with his previous experience as the executive officer of the aviation training squadron at Kasumigaura, Yamamoto foresaw the dominant role that carrier borne aircraft would have in the future of naval warfare. Upon his return from London in 1935 he became Vice Minister of the Navy where he exercised the power of his office to promote the development of naval aircraft and the aircraft carrier as the weapon of future battles. His reasoning during this period was at contrary to most navies of the world in general and the navy of Japan in particular, which still favored the battleship as the mainstay naval asset. This was made evident by Japan’s construction of sea-going behemoths like the 840+ft long Yamato and Musashi, each displacing approximately 70,000 tons (Jane’s 183). In spite of the resistance he faced Yamamoto was successful in prodding the navy into increasing Japan’s total carrier force to six with the 1938 construction of the carriers Shokaku and Zuikaku, which would participate in the attack on Pearl Harbor (Jane’s 187). He also ensured the development of more advance fighter and attack aircraft capable of operating from carrier decks. The result of this was the production of such aircraft as the Nakajima B5N torpedo bomber, the Aichi D3A dive-bomber, and the Mitsubishi A6M fighter, which were respectively code named the "Kate", "Val", and "Zero" by the allies during World War II. The reputation of the Zero, the first carrier-based fighter capable of out-performing its land-based counterpart, is legendary. During the first two years of the war the Zero or Zeke, was more than a match for even the most modern fighters of the U.S. Navy and the Army Air Corps by 1941. The U.S. Navy’s F4F Wildcat and the Army’s P-40 were outclassed in every respect except that they were more heavily armored and could rapidly dive away –altitude permitting- from a dogfight with the Zero if the need arose, which it often did. It was Yamamoto’s dogged persistence in directing the Navy’s time and resources toward the aviation component of naval might -at the expense of the battleships- that contributed to Japan’s effortless victories over the allies in the opening months of the war.

Mitsubishi A6M5 "Zero"                        Aichi D3A "Val"                                Nakajima B5N "Kate"