Lessons Learned


Japanese Zero in a dogfight

From The Zero Fighter World

The Battle of the Coral Sea had given the sailors and the pilots aboard the Yorktown battle experience. These men could now know what to expect. Also they were able to hone their skills. A great deal about air warfare had been learned from the first great carrier battle. The flaws of the American aircraft were exposed and brought to the fore. It became evident that the Navy needed better fighters and better torpedo planes. It was also learned that fighters in combat air patrols needed to fly at 20,000 feet instead of 10,000 feet. If the fighters would have been at that elevation, they could have thinned out the Japanese bombers with greater efficiency and reduced the effectiveness of the Japanese attack.

Admiral Aubrey Fitch saw that the Japanese had been using their land based aircraft more effectively than the Allies had. Fitch then recommended that more planes be stationed in the South Pacific and that those planes cooperate with naval units.

The advancements in technology and tactics were not only relegated to how planes and ships were to be used in the future. The development and the effective use of radar played a major role in Coral Sea. Radar officers were able to use this relatively new technology to aid in the victory of the U.S. forces in Coral Sea. Radar officers were able to track Japanese bombers at one point in the battle. This tracking enabled the American forces to set up an ambush for these bombers. Also, the effective use of "Magic" gave the Allies a good idea of what the Japanese were planning. The code breaking was not fulproof by any means, but the Allies at least had a clue to what the next Japanese move was going to be.

Coral Sea also brought about a change in strategy. Admiral Chester Nimitz and Admiral Ernest King agreed that it was in the best interest of the Navy not to fight the Japanese fleet head on. The Navy could no longer afford to "slug it out with the probably superior approaching Japanese forces." They agreed on a strategy of attrition. Given some time, the surging American economy would be able to produce multiple navies. Even Admiral Yamamoto was aware of this fact. He knew that Japan's resources were severely limited, and that a war of attrition would eventually result in an American victory.

This new strategy advocated stealth over strength. This was the only course of action that Nimitz could pursue, especially after seeing what had happened in the Coral Sea. They would attempt to use all naval resources to reduce the Japanese forces. Nimitz and King were in favor of increasing submarine attacks and air bombing, especially on isolated Japanese units. Nimitz, however, reluctantly elected this strategy. He saw this not as giving credit to the strength of the Japanese Imperial Navy, but as a defficiency of the American navy. These American inadequacies led to the decision by Nimitz to strengthen his long range striking capabilities. The slow and inefficient battleships would be relocated to the west coast of the United States. Nimitz was going to rely on the carrier striking forces combined with land based air power, similar to those that participated in the Battle of the Coral Sea.

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