By early 1940, President Roosevelt was a man divided. Europe was being menaced by a threatening dictator, and general war looked to be breaking out on the continent. The nations of France and England looked unwilling and incapable of stopping the Nazi onslaught. Having Europe under any one man's control provided a unique threat to the United States, as the Atlantic ocean grew smaller and smaller with the development of air power. A nation with a strong air presence could threaten coastal cities. This situation was made worse because that "one man" was not just any person, but the megalomaniac Adolf Hitler, and he was aided by a powerful Luftwaffe that dwarfed the Army Air Corps.

Meanwhile, Roosevelt found himself in a nation still bound by isolationist tendencies. The problems in Europe did not drastically affect the average citizen, while he or she still had memories of the Great War that was considered unnecessary. The Depression still racked the nation, unemployment levels were high, and the threat by Japan appeared to be more serious than a threat in Europe. In Congress, the Neutrality Acts had been amended to allow for a "cash and carry" policy, only a small step away from the arms embargo that had been placed in 1935. Roosevelt claimed that that the United States was not "neutral in thought", but the menaced nations of Europe needed naval support and weaponry, not sympathy. Roosevelt had cordial relations with Neville Chamberlain, but was more ideologically aligned with Winston Churchill. Both men were Navy men - Roosevelt had served as an Assistant Secretary of the Navy, while Churchill served as lord of the Admirality in England - and therefore both men understood the threat that was posed by the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe. Churchill appeared to have American sympathies, with an American mother and a belief in the unity of English-speaking nations.

For Roosevelt, the disasters in May of 1940 were tempered when Churchill replaced Chamberlain as Prime Minister. Churchill was hawkish; he rallied his people to war, and looked to be the most willing contributor to maintaining a partially free Europe. Despite this positive turn of events, in June of 1940, Roosevelt was absolutely unable to begin active support of the British Empire, denying Churchill's request for a "shopping list" of planes and ships. Instead, Roosevelt's efforts were directed at preparing America for the possibility of war. The fall of France and the danger of a Nazi England caused a swift change in Congressional isolationist tendencies. A $1.5 billion dollar military appropriations bill passed Congress, designed to beef up the 100,000 man army, and create an air force that could protect the United States and compete with the Europeans. Roosevelt took the initiative in preparing his cabinet for war, by appointing Henry Stimson as Secretary of War and Frank Knox as the Secretary of the Navy. In a speech to a Charlottesville, Virginia audience, Roosevelt claimed that the United States was moving "full speed ahead" in its prepardness policies.

Not all of America was in support of Roosevelt's position. Isolationists attacked his policies, stating that he was moving the United States closer to war. In one speech, noted America First member and aviation hero Charles Lindbergh denied that the United States was in any danger, and advocated a small air force and no aid to France or England. This speech was a precursor to Lindbergh's disastrous Des Moines speech of 1941. HEAR LINDBERGH

Roosevelt's main strategic concern was the Western Hemisphere. At the Pan-American Conference in late 1939, a 300 mile wide zone was set up, extending the length of the Atlantic Coast through South America, in which belligerent military actions were prohibited. Roosevelt assured Europe that any submarine traveling in this area would be attacked by patrolling United States warships. Throughout South and Central America, Roosevelt heard stories of Nazi-created uprisings. The addition of the French fleet, in May and June of 1940, placed a further threat on Allied South American neighbors like Brazil and Chile. To further drawn public attention away from Britain, Japan had stepped up its aggression in the East, demanding the close of the border between Indochina and China, and the cessation of trade through the ports of Hong Kong. These two strategically areas, each believed to be a greater threat to the greater United States, forced Roosevelt to deny military aid before Directive 16. The Battle of Britain began to mark a shift in United States policy. After it began to appear that England would weather the Nazi storm, Roosevelt began to inquire as to how to aid Britain militarily. In August, unable to bear the isolationism further, Roosevelt inquired to Churchill as to a "bases for destroyers" deal. The United States would send England fifty destroyers, twenty torpedo boats, and ten planes. In return, the United States would have access to British lands in the Western hemisphere , a popular move in guaranteeing United States hegemony. Roosevelt did this with no authorization from Congress; public opinion favored Roosevelt, however, as many recognized the strategic value in the new bases, for only the cost of old ships of war.

Churchill, for his part, was not particularly fond of giving away the British empire at a discount price. Mired in combat, he was ultimately left with little choice, and accepted the offer, and assured that the British fleet would not be scuttled. It was large step to a military alliance between America and England in 1940.

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