Operation Citadel: Battle of Kursk

        It took four months to prepare for the operation on the German side. They didn't feel adiquitly ready until they had collected 200 of the new Mark V Panther tanks, 90 Elefant Panzerjagers anc every flyable Henschel Hs 129 gound attack aircraft, as well as 146 Tiger I tanks, later model Panzer IV's and a number of captured Soviet T-34's and 76's. In total they assembled a strike force of 2,700 tanks, and assault guns, 1,800 aircraft and 800,000 men. It formed the greatest concentration of German fighting power ever assembled to date. Even so however, Hitler expressed his doubts about its adequacy.
        By this time in the war Allied action in Western Europe was beginning to have a significant impact on German military stength. Even though the allied actions in North Africa hardly constituted the Soviets longed for 2nd front, the battle there did begin to take its toll, and in the last quarter of 1942 and the first half of 1943, the Luftwaffe lost over 40% of its total strength in the battles over Malta and Tunisa. Luftwaffe air superiority was no longer guaranteed.
        The fighting began on July 4, 1943. In the afternoon, Junkers Ju 87 Stukas bombed a two-mile wide gap in the front lines on the north in a short period of 10 minutes, from there the German artillery opened up to continue the pounding. General Hoth's armored spearhead, the 3rd Panzerkorps, then advanced on the Soviet positions around Zavidovka. At the same time the Panzergrenadier-Divison Grossdeutschland, attacked Butovo in torrential rain, and the 11. Panzer Division took the high ground around Butovo. To the west of that point going was tougher for Grossdeutschland and the 3rd Panzer Division, which met stiff soviet resistance and did not secure their objectives until midnight.
        In the south the 2nd Panzerkorps launched preliminary attacks to secure observation posts, and again met with stiff resitance until assault troops equipped with flamethrower cleared the bunkers and outposts. At 10:30 PM the Soviets struck back with an artillery bombardment which aided by the heavy rain, slowed the German advance. By this time Soviet General Zhukov had recieved briefings on the information about the start of the offensive gained from captured Germans, he launched a pre-emptive artillery bombardment on the German assembly areas.
        The full on battle opened on July 5th, the Soviets now aware of even the time of the planned German offensive, commenced a massive artillery bombardment of the German lines 10 minutes prior. There soon followed a massive attack by the Soviet Air Force on the Luftwaffe airbases in the area, in an attempt to turn the tables on the old German way of wiping out the local air support within the first hour of the battle. The next few hours turned into the largest air battle, and the costliest air battle day ever fought. The Luftwaffe managed to defend itself against the Soviets, but from that point on the Soviet Air Force challenged them strongly.
        The 9th Army in the North found itself almost unable to move because of the mud and because of the Soviet minefields. They ran into the fields within minutes of the attack, so they couldn't press on without the use of engineering units, which had to move to the front under heavy artillery fire. There were a few significant reasons why Model's army didn't move at a higher speed; his group had less tanks then Manstein's army in the south, and he prefered to reserve some forces rather than strike with the usual Blitzkrieg method of everyone hit one spot at once. Because of Model's delayed progress, Soviet Central Front commander Marshal Rokossovski was able to anticipate where the German attacks were likely going to be, and they were able to fortify them heavily, leaving less likely areas thinner.
        After a week the Wehrmacht had moved only 10 kilometers forward, and on the 12th the Soviets launched their offensive against the 2nd Army at Orel. The 9th Army had to withdraw, their part in the offensive was over. Their casualty rate versus the Red Army stood at about 5:3 in their favor, the German tank losses were about 300 Pzkw III and IV, and half a dozen Tiger 1's and 50 tankdestroyers. However this fell short of the usual figures, and failed to keep up with the steady influx of new soldiers and material from the Red Army.
        In the South, the armored spearhead of Hoth's 4th Panzer Army forced its way forward, and by the 6th had reached about 30 kilometers past the lines at the small town of Prokhorovka. In the south the Soviets had not been able to pinpoint the German attack sectors, this forced them to spread out their defenses more evenly, thus making it easier for the Germans to attack.
        The threat of a German breakthrough forced the Red Army to deploy troops originally reserved for the counteroffensive. The German flank, however, stood unprotected as the Soviet 7th Guards Army stalled Kempf's divisions, aided by the heavy rain, the Germans were able to cross the Donets River. The 5th Guards Tank Army held positions in the east of Prokhorovka and had started to prepare a counterattack of their own when 2nd SS Panzerkorps arrived and an intense struggle ensued. The Soviets managed to halt the SS, but only a little bit now stood in the way of the 4th Panzer Army, and a German breakthrough looked like a very real possibility. The Soviets decided to deploy the rest of the 5th Guards Tank Army.
        On July 12th, the Luftwaffe and artillery units bombed the Soviet positions as the SS divisions formed up.   Here is the description of the account from Dallek's history of WWII, "The German advance started and they were astonished to see masses of Soviet armor advancing towards them. What followed was the largest tank engagement ever, with over 1,500 tanks in close contact. The air forces of both countries flew overhead, but they were unable to see anything through the dust and smoke pouring out from destroyed tanks. On the ground, commanders were unable to keep track of developments and the battle rapidly degenerated into an immense number of confused and bitter small-unit actions, often at close quarters. The fighting raged on all day, and by evening the last shots were being fired as the two sides disengaged. German lost 60 tanks and assault guns with the Soviets losing at least eight to ten times that number.. If all tank battles were fought like those at Prochorovka, the Soviets would have totally run out of tanks in a short time. In the most famous action of the day the T-70 and T-34 tanks of the Red Army's 18th and 29th Tank Corps of the 5th Guards Tank Army charged headlong at the SS's Tigers. The T34s were faster but more lightly armoured and armed - they aimed to exploit weaknesses in the German machines' armour at close range. The Germans destroyed most Soviet tanks at long range, and relatively few became involved in short-range exchanges of fire. German units actually incurred relatively light casualties (only 2 Tigers were lost), and for most of the day they fought in good order. The battle can best be described as a very costly tactical loss but an operative success for the Soviets. The Soviets lost 822 tanks (more than half of them beyond repair), had more than 1000 dead and an additional 2500 missing or wounded. German losses reached less than 10% of that and they had the battlefield at the end of the day. However, the German attack was stalled. Significantly, elite Soviet Guards Airborne units were holding firm on the flanks of the very narrow German penetration. The Germans could not squeeze many units into this narrow front, nor did they have the combat power to widen the penetration."
The overall battle still hung in the balance. German forces on the southern wing were exhausted, they nevertheless faced equally weak defenses and had an excellent position, which was clear of the defensive works, and which faced no forces between them and Kursk. It was at this time during the battle, that had the Germans had sufficient reserves, they might had won.
        The battle of Kursk was lost by the Germans by sheer exhaustion, high combat casualties and lack of infantry reserves. Most German divisions lost between 2000 and 3500 (experienced) combat troops (grenadiers) in a relative short time span and therefore lost a lot of their initial assault strenth. Tank losses (about 500) were high but not critical. After Kursk the Soviets went to the offensive. From that moment on, the Germans lost even more armor and infantry than at Kursk, which resulted in a steady withdrawal towards the Dniepr.