In the beginning of 1943, Erich von Manstein
presented to the Oberkommando des
Heeres (OKH) that he could launch a summer assault and use the same
successful lines he had just pursued at Kharkov, when he cut off an
overextended Soviet offensive. He suggested baiting them with the
frantically re-forming 6th Army, thus leading them into the Donets
Basin in the eastern Ukraine. From there, Manstein could turn
south from Kharkov on the Eastern side of the Donets River towards
Rostov and trap the entire southern wing of the Red Army against the
Sea of Azrov. Thus tightening the noose around the Soviet's
throats.
The plan was not approved by the OKH, nor was it approved by Hitler himself. He had a statement made that it would look weak and therefore be unwise moraly and politically to retreat and give back land. Hitler didn't want to "pay for the same real estate twice". So in Manstein's plans' place, the OKH presented a plan that would pay attention to the obvious bulge in the lines between Orel and Kharkov. There were three whole Soviet armies occupying the ground in and around the salient, therefore pinching it off would trap nearly a fifth of the Red Army. It would also result in a straighter and shorter front line. The railway town of Kursk would have been strategically useful for the transportation of soldiers, food and gear.
By March the plans had become clearer, Walther Model's 9th Army was to attack south from Orel, while at the same time Hoth's 4th Panzer Army and Armee-Abteilung Kempf, under Manstein's commands would attack north from Kharkov, with a meeting spot in Kursk planed, but perchance one of them can continue to push on towards Moscow; they would be allowed under their own inititiation to continue. Opposite to his most recent behavior, Hitler gave the General Staff considerable control ovcr the planning of the battle. As plans were set, the front lines were stripped of anything useful for a defensive struggle, and were sent off to be used at the strike point. The first date for the plan was May 4th, however it changed twice, once to June 12th, and once to July 4th. The reason for the delay was to allow for time for production of the Mark V Panther tanks, and for other weapons to arrive from Germany.
The Operation was doomed to failure from the begining. The OKH's decision to attack at the Kursk Salient, the most obvious place to attack, was what did the damage. The selecting of such an obvious strike area was actually the antithesis of what the German army traditionally went for. On top of that, the extended delays in the attack gave the Soviets plenty of time to prepare ample defense structues, and to obtain the largest anti-armor force of all time. When asked this question by Heinz Guderian, " Is it really necessary to attack Kursk, and indeed in the east this year at all? Do you think that anyone even knows where Kursk is?" Hitler's response was "I know, the thought of it turns my stomach." So we can see that the Operation was not only un-inspired by the OKH, but complete lack of faith in the plan was seen in the Fueher himself. The plan was simply put, completly uninspired.
The plan was not approved by the OKH, nor was it approved by Hitler himself. He had a statement made that it would look weak and therefore be unwise moraly and politically to retreat and give back land. Hitler didn't want to "pay for the same real estate twice". So in Manstein's plans' place, the OKH presented a plan that would pay attention to the obvious bulge in the lines between Orel and Kharkov. There were three whole Soviet armies occupying the ground in and around the salient, therefore pinching it off would trap nearly a fifth of the Red Army. It would also result in a straighter and shorter front line. The railway town of Kursk would have been strategically useful for the transportation of soldiers, food and gear.
By March the plans had become clearer, Walther Model's 9th Army was to attack south from Orel, while at the same time Hoth's 4th Panzer Army and Armee-Abteilung Kempf, under Manstein's commands would attack north from Kharkov, with a meeting spot in Kursk planed, but perchance one of them can continue to push on towards Moscow; they would be allowed under their own inititiation to continue. Opposite to his most recent behavior, Hitler gave the General Staff considerable control ovcr the planning of the battle. As plans were set, the front lines were stripped of anything useful for a defensive struggle, and were sent off to be used at the strike point. The first date for the plan was May 4th, however it changed twice, once to June 12th, and once to July 4th. The reason for the delay was to allow for time for production of the Mark V Panther tanks, and for other weapons to arrive from Germany.
The Operation was doomed to failure from the begining. The OKH's decision to attack at the Kursk Salient, the most obvious place to attack, was what did the damage. The selecting of such an obvious strike area was actually the antithesis of what the German army traditionally went for. On top of that, the extended delays in the attack gave the Soviets plenty of time to prepare ample defense structues, and to obtain the largest anti-armor force of all time. When asked this question by Heinz Guderian, " Is it really necessary to attack Kursk, and indeed in the east this year at all? Do you think that anyone even knows where Kursk is?" Hitler's response was "I know, the thought of it turns my stomach." So we can see that the Operation was not only un-inspired by the OKH, but complete lack of faith in the plan was seen in the Fueher himself. The plan was simply put, completly uninspired.
