Background

        Since the rise of the Nazi German War Machine, the German Wehrmacht had relied on the legendary Blitzkrieg tactic. The tactic relied on all available armored, aerial and ground forces to race through enemy lines at maximum-speed, at a single point into the enemy lines; in order to act as a spearhead. Once breaking through, the attack was to focus on cutting off the enemy front line troops, while avoiding direct combat, and proceeding to the enemy supply lines. To be effective, this tactic relied on the enemy forces being undisciplined and being caught unprepared to defend against the overwhelming force. It was because of the element of suprize that the Ardennes strike, and the first Stalingrad strike were so successful. The war on the Eastern Front throughout the war had been fought as a series of summer offensives by the Germans, with massive territories being taken; however, these Summer offensives were followed by fierce winters, and punishing Russian counterattacks.
      In the winter of 1942-1943, the Germans lost the Battle of Stalingrad. One complete German army had been lost, along with around 500,000 Germans and Allies. This loss devasted the strength of the German Wehrmacht, and the Axis Strength in the east. Knowing that an allied invasion in the west was inevitable, Hitler decided to shoot for a draw with Stalin. He knew that with the winter losses, the complete and outright dominance of the Soviets would be impossible to obtain.
        With confidence in the Hindenburg line's defensive strength in the west, which increased their strength by shortening the lines, the Germans planned construction of a similar series of defensive works known as the Panter-Wotan line. The intention of this defensive series was to retreat to it and to bleed the Russians to death while their forces recuperated from long marches, months of fighting, cold and lack of food.
        In February and March of 1943, German General Erich Von Manstein had completed an offensive during the Third Battle of Kharkov, leaving the front line running roughly from Leningrad in the North to Rostov in the South. In the middle lay a large 200 km wide and 150 km deep Soviet-held salient (a bulge) in the lines between the German forward positions near Orel in the north, and Manstein's recently taken Kharkov in the South.