One factor that led to Bataan's downfall was MacArthur's delayed decision to retreat to it. Consequently, there was not enough time to fully equip the Peninsula with food and medicine. According to Orange, Bataan needed enough food for 43,000 men for six months. The retreat sent 80,000 troops to Bataan. The transferred food would only last thirty days. Their shortages also included medicine, clothing, blankets, and sun helmets. On January 5, the troops went on half rations. (24)
The American and Filipino troops on Bataan were backed by those on Corregidor, where MacArthur had established the U.S. Far East Command Headquarters (USAFFE). Initially in Malinta Tunnel there were about 5,000 men, sixty-eight women (nurses, civilian, and army wives) and children, such as MacArthur's 4-year-old son, Arthur. (25) By the time Corregidor surrendered, thousands more men, women, (military and civilian) and children would go there for protection. Bataan and Corregidor were to support each other. They would either both survive or both fall. The Japanese attacked Bataan first.
By January 22, the U.S. lost the first defense line in Bataan, the Abucay-Mauban line. To complicate the situation, Mount Natib separated Wainwright and Parker's troops. The troops were outnumbered and had to retreat to the Bagac-Orion Line, their second and final battle line. Two days later, MacArthur realized Bataan would fall. He ordered the food stocks in Bataan to be transferred to Corregidor with the hope that reinforcements from the U.S. could arrive by July. If Bataan fell, the Philippine division would be transferred to Corregidor. But the troops were not transferred because they managed to hold the line. (26) Both sides would continue to fight with heavy casualties, but Japan could not break through.
By February 8 it was General Homma rather than General MacArthur who was in serious trouble. His losses had been so great in dead, wounded, and seriously ill that he realized he must call off his offensive and retreat. By February 24, after his withdrawal far to the rear had been completed, his 6th Division, once nearly 14,000 strong, numbered but 712 effectives. Nara's 65th Brigade was down to only 1,000 men from its original 6,500, and many of these were wobbling from illness and weakness. Homma's combat strength numbered in companies instead of regiments. (27)
Japan could not send more reinforcements until March 24. By then, MacArthur would be ordered to Australia and Wainwright would assume command. (28)
The soldiers on Bataan believed convoys would bring them supplies and reinforcements. On January 15, MacArthur supported these beliefs, saying
"Help is on the way from the United States. ... Thousands of troops and hundreds of planes are being dispatched." He did not predict when they wold arrive, but adding, "Our supplies are ample," he exhorted his men to hold out until aid came. Most personnel on Bataan and Corregidor, commissioned and enlisted alike, believed him. (29)
The few who learned that Japan controlled the Pacific knew convoys would not be able to come, but they kept silent. Attempts were made to keep morale up, such as listening to the Voice of Freedom broadcast. Japanese propaganda did not succeed, though numerous attempts were made to bring about surrender. These included dropping pamphlets and playing the song "Ships that never come in" on KZRH in Manila.
The only way for convoys to successfully reach those in the Pacific would be to come through Australia. But the ships and men needed for success would mean the U.S. had to abandon Europe, which Washington was not willing to do in January 1942. "Only three ships succeeded in getting from Australia to the southern Philippines, where their cargo was unloaded for transshipment to Corregidor in smaller vessels. Several other ships were sunk." (30) A few submarines made it through as well. MacArthur managed to transfer a thousand of the ten thousand tons of food from an Army depot in Cebu to those but this was only enough for four days. By March, these attempts and blockade running from Manila became too dangerous. (31)