As world tensions increased, priorities had to be determined. In 1939 war broke out in Europe. By 1940 Great Britain looked as though it was ready to lose to Germany. This meant the U.S. Navy would be needed in the Pacific and Atlantic. In 1940 and 1941 decisions were made in Washington to put Europe first. Admiral Harold R. Stark, chief of Naval Operations, decided not to follow Orange, but a 1915 plan which said the U.S. Naval Fleet would not go west of the 180th meridian during a Pacific War. The Navy would no longer come to rescue those on Bataan or Corregidor. Still, no modifications were made to Orange to help the ground troops now that they would not be reinforced after their six-month siege.
Despite the fact that allocations for the Philippines were usually no more than thirty-nine thousand dollars by 1938, as tensions increased with Japan, the islands became strategically important to Washington again. Therefore, MacArthur was recommissioned and given command of the Far East's American Army forces. He was given permission to mobilize 200,000 Filipino reservists into infantry and coast artilleries.
Both MacArthur and the War Department seem to have become convinced that if these men could achieve a reasonable stage of training and if enough B-17 and B-24 heavy bombers and P-40 fighters could reach the islands by April, 1942, a deterrent barrier to Japanese invasion would exist, and a Pacific war would be averted. (8)
MacArthur decided to change Orange. Troops would no longer retreat to Bataan, but would defend Luzon's beaches. In November 1941, the War Department agreed. "For the first time in its history the United States was endeavoring to provide its Philippines dependency with the equipment and men necessary for a successful defense." (9) Corregidor did not receive much of the equipment, but did receive the equipment to decode messages, called Magic. Magic was used to crack the Japanese diplomatic codes. (10)
While the U.S. was making defensive plans, Japan in July 1940, was deciding its offensive strategy in case diplomatic meetings did not keep the U.S. from opposing its expansionist plan. Japan wanted the Philippines as part of its Asian Territory, called the Southern Resources Area. Capturing the islands was one its objectives in the first phase of a three phase war. The Japanese believed they could beat the U.S. forces on the Philippines in fifty days. (11) One reason Japan was successful in its initial operations was due to "prewar United States intelligence [not crediting] the Japanese with the capacity to undertake more than one major amphibious operation at a time." (12)