Click on this map of the opening moves
in France. From Clash of Chariots.FRANCE 1940
Many who watched as Germany rolled over Poland in September 1939 attributed it to 'a modern army attacking a second-rate army.' Most never thought such a feat could be accomplished against the largest army in Europe and the highly skilled British Expeditionary Forces (BEF) also stationed in France after Germany's move into Poland.
To the world's surprise, Germany's new Panzer armies sliced through the crumbling French defenses at Sedan as they fought to and across the Meuse river in only 3 days. The French plan of "Methodical Battle," an outdated concept based on WW I, called for the French defenses to be ready in 4 days. One day too late.
In short, Guderian, Hoth, and Rommel, among other German leaders, presented the French Army with exactly the one thing their planning and training was ill-suited to deal; a fast-paced, chaotic battlefield.
On the other hand, the German use of massed tank formations and radios in every tank, pushed through just before the war by Heinz Guderian, and the German practice of using 'Mission Orders' that allowed commanders flexibility and room for initiative, were ideally suited to overrun and demoralize the French troops.
This is not to say French troops didn't fight well. On several occasions, they fought well at the tactical level against German infantry and tanks. In fact, most French and British tanks were superior to those fielded by the Germans. The Allies also fielded about 1,000 more tanks than the Germans. The Allied error was that they fielded them in small, tightly controlled battalions, with the mission of supporting the infantry. This tied them to the 3 mph speed that infantry has been fighting at since the times of Alexander.
Click HERE to see a comparison of Allied and German forces during the Battle of France, 1940!
Whether intentional or accidental, a copy of the German war plan fell into Allied hands shortly after the fall of Poland. The plan called for a re-run of the Schlieffen Plan of 1914. This is exactly what the Allies expected. Mainly due to the arguments of Gen Manstein, and supported by Guderian, the recognized tank expert, the plan slowly evolved into an attack through the Ardennes forest. This route cut at the weakest point in the French defenses, just North of the Maginot Line and just South of the Allies' strongest units in Belgium. To help in the process, the Allies moved their forces North into Belgium as soon as hostilities broke out, based on the captured plans and their own preconceived ideas. The Germans reinforced this misconception with strong attacks into Belgium to keep the Allies pinned there.
Click on this map of the opening moves
in France. From Clash of Chariots.
The main weight of the German thrust, thanks to strong arguments by Manstein and Guderian, and backing by Rundstedt, was weaving its way through the narrow roads of the Ardennes. Erwin Rommel, with dashing charm, gifted intuition, and maddening drive, pushed his 2nd Panzer Division to the Meuse River in only 3 days, and forced his way across. On Day 4 of the invasion (May 14) Rommel beat back strong counter-attacks by French tanks, aided by Stukas and his 88's, and began the drive to the English Channel. Within a few days the battle was decided, although on May 24 Hitler ordered Guderian and his legions to stop the drive to Dunkirk, allowing over 300,000 British troops to escape.
This
map shows German forces advancing to the English Channel. From Clash of
Chariots.
Germany's greatest advantage over the Allies early in the war was the ability of it's leaders to act quickly and decisively. This was a train honed in the German training programs. The Allies followed, at least institutionally, a nearly opposite course of Methodical Battle. This command structure was so slow that by the time the French commander at Sedan ordered a counter-attack on the Meuse beachhead, Rommel's tanks were already 40 miles behind the command post!
Secondly, the failure, or perhaps more accurately, the misinterpretation of lessons from tank employment in WW I ensured that France and Britain would disperse their numerically superior tanks throughout their sector of defense. This trend was continued all the way into North Africa. Germany, on the other hand, was able to mass it's resources at the decisive time and place, and backed with a frighteningly efficient supply system (as far as armies are efficient anywhere) was able to sustain a drive deep into enemy territory.
Lastly, and probably the only significant advantage Germany held on the tactical level (but what an advantage it was!) was a far superior method of calling and directing supporting fires. While most German artillery was still horse-drawn at this point, it was the Stuka, and the Luftwaffe's flexible, responsive command, that gave the Wehrmacht the punch it needed to break through and sustain drives over long distances.
Clash of Chariots
Strange Victory
Iron Fist
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by Chris Shimp March 1, 2001