Ludwig Ritter von Eimannsberger
Little known but equally advanced in thinking as Guderian and others was the Austrian Ludwig Ritter von Eimannsberger. As an Austrian general, von Eimannsberger had few prospects for developing a Panzer arm in the anti-war Austrian republic following WW I. But in 1934, he published his book, Tank Warfare (Kampfwagenkrieg), clearly aimed at a German audence. The terminology and symbols were all German, as Germany clearly had a much greater prospect of re-militarizing with the Nazi party in power.
Von Eimannsberger thought of the tank as not only being able to breach enemy defenses, but also to exploit them in the traditional cavalry role. Toward this end he recommended that, along with the two battalions of medium tanks per brigade, a light battalion should also be present. This battalion should further be either entrained or on trucks, to increase their range once a breakthrough is acheived. Also, once the light tanks are on the ground, a large support infastructure is already present, to allow supplies to be brought forward to the exploitation forces. All of these ideas were used by Germany and vocalized by Guderian, but it is unknown if von Eimannsberger had any influence in Guderian or not.
Von Eimannsberger also incorporated the need for motorized or mechanized infantry into his blueprint. His panzer battalion called for infantry companies with anti tank weapons, anti tank guns, and even pioneer companies. His division called for 9 battalions of such infantry, pioneer and anti-tank/artillery infantry, somewhat lighter than would be employed by the German combined Kampfgruppes later in the war.
Another visionary topic brought forth by von Eimannsberger was the use of multi-purpose guns rather than a myriad of artillery pieces, anti-aircraft (AA) guns and anti-tank (AT) guns. His ideas may have formed the precedent for the soon-to-be famous German 88.
One key area where Eimannsberger differed from the later proponents of armored warfare was his belief that armor did not solely have to be employed as either infantry support at the tactical level or in independent maneuver elements, affecting war at the operational level. In 1940, Germany almost completely fielded its armor in independent maneuver elements. France did the opposite, leaving only 2 brigades to maneuver independently. Von Eimmansberger argued in his book that, although operating independently was untried, it should work. Further, there was no need to completely separate the manuever role from the tactical support role. The one-sided thinking followed by the major powers in 1940 seems strangely obvious in a way. Perhaps it was the reality of being short of tanks that neither side wanted to stray far from its established roles in 1940. Certainly the German idea of massed forces did not play into Eimannsberger's line of thinking.
In all, Ludwig Ritter von Eimannsberger was truly a visionary. His ideas were directly on line with the most advanced thinkers in Germany, France, Russia and Britain. We may never know how much his thoughts and ideas, as published in Kampfwagenkrieg, influenced the development of modern armored warfare.
Tactical Noteboo
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By Chris Shimp March 1, 2001