The Sinking
Captain McVay III requested a destroyer escort for his trip to the Philippines, but was denied on the basis that it was unnecessary. No Navy vessel that lacked anti-submarine warfare gear had ever made the trip without a destroyer escort. Even so, Captain McVay III went forth with his orders, and as time would tell, was sailing blindly towards disaster.
There were several pieces of information that were withheld from Captain McVay III about his planned route to Leyte Gulf in
the Philippines. While in port in Guam , the ship's navigation
officer, Commander Janney, filed their planned course of travel (MOVREQ-
a message telling the Naval chain of command of their intended course and
actions), and received the briefing of enemy activity along their course.
Upon returning to the ship and being questioned by the Captain, he dismissed
three possible enemy submarine sightings as insignificant.
Only two days prior to the departure of the Indianapolis for Leyte Gulf, the USS Underhill was sunk by a Japanese submarine within range of the Indianapolis' proposed course. There were also three possible submarine sightings within a weeks period: one on the 22nd of July, and two on the 25th of July. Our ability to break Japanese codes thanks to Ultra, had given us the information that a Japanese submarine identified as the I-58 was operating in the path of the Indianapolis.
Captain McVay III was given the order to "zigzag" at his discretion. "Zigzagging" is a Naval maneuver that was thought to help a ship avoid getting hit by a torpedo. There are many different opinions as to whether or not this actually works, and at the time the Indianapolis was sunk, there was no standing order for United States Navy Captains to "zigzag" in restricted visibility.
A perfect example for the argument against "zigzagging" is the Shinano . The Shinano was Japan's largest and most advanced aircraft carrier, and was being pursued by a United States Submarine, the Archfish . The Shinano was beginning to pull away from the Archfish , when suddenly she "zigged." The new course took her straight towards the perusing U.S. submarine. The Archfish sank the Shinano on November 28, 1944.
At the time of the two torpedo strikes (a few minutes past midnight on July 30, 1945), there was low visibility. Captain McVay III left orders to cease "zigzagging" until visibility had increased, and went to bed. If there was any doubt as to weather or not to resume "zigzagging" he was to be woken. Captain McVay III was known by his crew to be reachable and approachable at any time they deemed necessary, so if the visibility had cleared, they would have either resumed "zigzagging" or woken him up.
Captain McVay III requested a destroyer escort for his trip to the Philippines, but was denied on the basis that it was unnecessary. No Navy vessel that lacked anti-submarine warfare gear had ever made the trip without a destroyer escort. Even so, Captain McVay III went forth with his orders, and as time would tell, was sailing blindly towards disaster.
There were several pieces of information that were withheld from Captain McVay III about his planned route to Leyte Gulf in
the Philippines. While in port in Guam , the ship's navigation
officer, Commander Janney, filed their planned course of travel (MOVREQ-
a message telling the Naval chain of command of their intended course and
actions), and received the briefing of enemy activity along their course.
Upon returning to the ship and being questioned by the Captain, he dismissed
three possible enemy submarine sightings as insignificant. Only two days prior to the departure of the Indianapolis for Leyte Gulf, the USS Underhill was sunk by a Japanese submarine within range of the Indianapolis' proposed course. There were also three possible submarine sightings within a weeks period: one on the 22nd of July, and two on the 25th of July. Our ability to break Japanese codes thanks to Ultra, had given us the information that a Japanese submarine identified as the I-58 was operating in the path of the Indianapolis.
Captain McVay III was given the order to "zigzag" at his discretion. "Zigzagging" is a Naval maneuver that was thought to help a ship avoid getting hit by a torpedo. There are many different opinions as to whether or not this actually works, and at the time the Indianapolis was sunk, there was no standing order for United States Navy Captains to "zigzag" in restricted visibility.
A perfect example for the argument against "zigzagging" is the Shinano . The Shinano was Japan's largest and most advanced aircraft carrier, and was being pursued by a United States Submarine, the Archfish . The Shinano was beginning to pull away from the Archfish , when suddenly she "zigged." The new course took her straight towards the perusing U.S. submarine. The Archfish sank the Shinano on November 28, 1944.
At the time of the two torpedo strikes (a few minutes past midnight on July 30, 1945), there was low visibility. Captain McVay III left orders to cease "zigzagging" until visibility had increased, and went to bed. If there was any doubt as to weather or not to resume "zigzagging" he was to be woken. Captain McVay III was known by his crew to be reachable and approachable at any time they deemed necessary, so if the visibility had cleared, they would have either resumed "zigzagging" or woken him up.
Two charges were eventually filed against
Captain McVay III; he failed to issue timely orders to abandon ship, and
that he had hazarded his ship by failing to "zigzag" in good visibility.
As for the first charge, the torpedoes had knocked out the ship's electrical
system, making it impossible to use the ship's public address system to
announce the abandon ship call. This left "word of mouth" as the only
alternative. This being the case, the fact that almost 900 of the 1,196
crew members were able to abandon ship before the ship sank is grounds enough
to dismiss this charge on its own.
As for the latter charge. There was no Navy directive that required Navy Captains to "zigzag" at night or at times of restricted visibility. Since the attack took place at midnight, the first assumption is obvious: it was dark when the Indianapolis was attacked. To take this even further though, crew members testified that there was low visibility at the time of the attack as
well.
So if either one of these are true, Captain McVay III should not have been "zigzagging" at the time of attack, that is according to standing Naval Doctrine.
Hashimoto, the commander of the I-58- the Japanese submarine that attacked and sank the Indianapolis, testified in Captain McVay III's court martial. He claimed that even if the Indianapolis had ben "zigzagging," he would have still been able to sink the ship. This combined with a decorated United States submarine commander's testimony that he too would have been able to sink the Indianapolis given the same situation, regardless of whether or not the ship was "zigzagging," had no effect on the courts decision.
Captain McVay III was found guilty of endangering his ship and his crew by failing to "zigzag" in good visibility. It is easy to sit back 66 years later and say that he was a "scape goat," but that is exactly what happened. Captain McVay III took the blame for the greatest Naval tragedy of the century, even though the blame was not his to take.
The following i s a copy of Hashimoto's letter that he wrote to the Chairman of the Armed services committee in an attempt to help clear Captain McVay III from any wrong doing:
"November 24, 1999
Attn: The Honorable John W. Warner
Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee
Russell Office Building, Washington, D.C. 20510
"I hear that your legislature is considering resolutions which would clear the name of the late Charles Butler McVay III, captain of the USS Indianapolis which was sunk on July 30, 1945, by torpedoes fired from the submarine which was under my command.
"I do not understand why Captain McVay was court-martialed. I do not understand why he was convicted on the charge of hazarding his ship by failing to zigzag because I would have been able to launch a successful torpedo attack against his ship whether it had been zigzagging or not.
"I have met may of your brave men who survived the sinking of the Indianapolis. I would like to join them in urging that your national legislature clear their captain's name.
"Our peoples have forgiven each other for that terrible war and its consequences. Perhaps it is time your peoples forgave Captain McVay for the humiliation of his unjust conviction.
"Mochitsura Hashimoto
former captain of I-58
Japanese Navy at WWII
Umenomiya Taisha
30 Fukeno Kawa Machi, Umezu
Ukyo-ku, Kyoto 615-0921, Japan"
As for the latter charge. There was no Navy directive that required Navy Captains to "zigzag" at night or at times of restricted visibility. Since the attack took place at midnight, the first assumption is obvious: it was dark when the Indianapolis was attacked. To take this even further though, crew members testified that there was low visibility at the time of the attack as
well.So if either one of these are true, Captain McVay III should not have been "zigzagging" at the time of attack, that is according to standing Naval Doctrine.
Hashimoto, the commander of the I-58- the Japanese submarine that attacked and sank the Indianapolis, testified in Captain McVay III's court martial. He claimed that even if the Indianapolis had ben "zigzagging," he would have still been able to sink the ship. This combined with a decorated United States submarine commander's testimony that he too would have been able to sink the Indianapolis given the same situation, regardless of whether or not the ship was "zigzagging," had no effect on the courts decision.
Captain McVay III was found guilty of endangering his ship and his crew by failing to "zigzag" in good visibility. It is easy to sit back 66 years later and say that he was a "scape goat," but that is exactly what happened. Captain McVay III took the blame for the greatest Naval tragedy of the century, even though the blame was not his to take.
The following i s a copy of Hashimoto's letter that he wrote to the Chairman of the Armed services committee in an attempt to help clear Captain McVay III from any wrong doing:
"November 24, 1999
Attn: The Honorable John W. Warner
Chairman, Senate Armed Services Committee
Russell Office Building, Washington, D.C. 20510
"I hear that your legislature is considering resolutions which would clear the name of the late Charles Butler McVay III, captain of the USS Indianapolis which was sunk on July 30, 1945, by torpedoes fired from the submarine which was under my command.
"I do not understand why Captain McVay was court-martialed. I do not understand why he was convicted on the charge of hazarding his ship by failing to zigzag because I would have been able to launch a successful torpedo attack against his ship whether it had been zigzagging or not.
"I have met may of your brave men who survived the sinking of the Indianapolis. I would like to join them in urging that your national legislature clear their captain's name.
"Our peoples have forgiven each other for that terrible war and its consequences. Perhaps it is time your peoples forgave Captain McVay for the humiliation of his unjust conviction.
"Mochitsura Hashimoto
former captain of I-58
Japanese Navy at WWII
Umenomiya Taisha
30 Fukeno Kawa Machi, Umezu
Ukyo-ku, Kyoto 615-0921, Japan"
The Rescue
The fact that the crew of the USS Indianapolis spent over four days in the water without the Navy realizing that they had lost a ship drew a lot of attention in and of itself. If it had not been for a PV-1 Ventura Bomber spotting the crew while on a routine anti-submarine mission, who knows how long they would have been in the water, or if any of them would have survived.
The Navy claims that the Indianapolis did not have enough time from the time that the torpedoes hit, to the time that the ship sank, to send off a distress signal. This is contrary to what a Radioman stationed aboard the Indianapolis testified to at a Senate hearing. He claims to have seen the needle on the transmitter jump as the distress signal was sent, indicating that a signal indeed was sent. There are reports that at least three different locations received a signal indicating a ship was sinking around the time that the Indianapolis was.
Using the code breaking of Ultra, the United States decoded a message from a Japanese submarine (the I-58), reporting that it had just sank a U.S. warship. Some maintain that the United States did not act on this information, as well as the distress signal mentioned for fear that it was a Japanese trap to lure United States ships into the area for an ambush.
The Navy had in place a directive that only allowed the announcing of the arrival of non-combatant ships. This was to cut down on the intelligence gathering ability of the enemy. With this directive in place, Guam would never know that the Indianapolis had never arrived. The only way that the Indianapolis would be missed, is if the receiving command correctly decoded the MOVREQ. Unfortunately, the message that was received by the receiving command was garbled, and was unable to be decoded. Rather than requesting that a repeat of the message be sent, the message was forgotten about, and thus the lives of so many lost.
This incident made the Navy reanalyze the way that it conducts some of its business. Only days after the rescue of the Indianapolis' crew, the directive that may have helped cause one of the worse Naval tragedies in history was changed. They would now announce the arrival of all combatant as well as non-combatant ships.