Montgomery's Eighth Army and the Royal Air Force's Western Desert Force had a level of cooperation on the battle field the Allies failed to immolate. The total break down of air ground coordination did not become clear until the Battle for the Kasserine Pass in February 1943.

At the time every Task Force had it's own Air Command and Naval Command. Eastern Air Command was to work in conjunction with Eastern Task Force. Under the leadership of Air Marshal William Welsh Eastern Air Command was to support Anderson's First Army.

From late December until early February General Eisenhower called a halt to all Allied operation in Northern Tunisia due to the winter rains and the need to reinforce ground troops lost in November and air units to combat the air dominance of the Germans.  Tunisia's landscape is very mountainous. There are a series of large difficult hills which connect to form an upside down Y. The hills and passes that form the left side of the Y is called the Western Dorsal and the hills on the right is the Eastern Dorsal.  While the weather is dry and dusty from March until November, when the rains come the ground becomes soft sticky icy clay.

On January 31st an American convoy was attacked by German bomber. This incident sparked a controversy between  Air Command and ground commanders. The generals in command of ground troops wanted close air support. The idea of using bombers as an extension of the battle taking out enemy tanks and troops was preferred and pushed by the ground commanders. The air commanders wanted to take a strategic approach rather than a tactical one. They wanted permission to bomb enemy airdromes, airfields and installations.  The idea is to again air superiority by destroying the enemy's air force. If enemy planes or installations are of no use, they effectively can not be used against Allied troops on the ground or hinder Allied planes.   Because of this lack of strategic usage the Luftwaffe was able to maintain air superiority just by staying functional.

This conflict was resolved during the Casablanca Conference in January 1943(14-23) when the North Africa Tactical Air Force was created under the command of Major General Carl Spaatz. The NATAF's job would not longer be providing direct air support for ground troops during battles but specific planned targets such as troop concentrations. The Air Force would no longer be used as an appendage to the ground troops but to be seen as an equal partner in joint operations to be used in a rear support.

The effects in this change in doctrine wasn't felt until April 18th, 1943. In mid January the Twelfth Air Force commanded by Brigadier General Jimmy Doolittle began air attacks on Axis supply ships coming from Italy. The attacks were so successful Luftwaffe fighters were being sent to patrol ports to protect German ships. With fighters drawn away from the battle field to protect supply lines  German air superiority began to wane. With the Axis still using their air support as "flying artillery" their ground troops had come to depend on fighters to assist in the battle. As more German fighters were needed on the battle field, operations to bomb Allied ports ended to free up planes. This enabled the Allies to receive in more supplies and reinforcements.

The bombing of Axis supply lines was so successful Germany began to fly in supplies rather than continue shipping. This also deferred planes from the battle field in the worse way. On the 18th of April, German transports numbering more than a hundred  with an escort of mixed Axis fighters was intercepted. The loss of seven American fighters compared to the loss of 78 Axis fighters earned the title "Palm Sunday Massacre."

 The growth of Allied air strength was the result of a change in tactics which forced the Luftwaffe to react. Their reaction negatively effected the dominate strategy used by German ground troops to hold and keep their positions.
 
 
 

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