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FDR, Churchill at Quebec 1943/08/24, from FDRL
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1st Quebec wartime conference codenamed QUADRANT with FDR, Churchill, MacKenzie King Aug. 17-24, 1943, emphasized growing unity on military strategy but also growing political disunity.
Churchill wanted to continue full participation in the Manhattan project, but FDR began to restrict British access; FDR and Churchill did agree not to share information with Stalin.
Churchill agreed to central Pacific strategy of Nimitz (PAC-10), and to a U.S. command of OVERLORD.
no Balkan invasion (never officially proposed by Churchill, but only to get Turkey into war, as a path into central Europe)
Burma postponed.
target date for defeat of Japan set at 1 year following defeat of Germany (Japan to be Oct. 1945)
decision to invade Italy approved by CCS July 20, due to success of Sicily.
600,000 Allied troops & 150,000 airmen in Mediterranean - momentum important.
Document from The Avalon Project:
President Roosevelt and Prime Minister Churchill to Marshal Stalin, August 21, 1943.
Secret and personal to Marshal Stalin from the United States Government and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom.
In our conference at Quebec, just concluded, we have arrived at the following decision as to military operations to be carried out during 1943 and 1944.
The bomber offensive against Germany will be continued on a rapidly increased scale from bases in the United Kingdom and Italy. The objectives of this air attack will be to destroy the German air combat strength, to dislocate the German military, industrial, and economic system, and to prepare the way for a cross channel invasion.
A large-scale buildup of American forces in the United Kingdom is now underway. It will provide an initial assault force of British and American divisions for cross channel operations. A bridgehead in the continent once secured will be reinforced steadily by additional American troops at the rate of from three to five divisions per month. This operation will be the primary British and American ground and air effort against the Axis.
The war in the Mediterranean is to be pressed vigorously. Our objectives in that area will be the elimination of Italy from the Axis alliance, and the occupation of that country as well as Sardinia and Corsica as bases for operations against Germany.
Our operations in the Balkans will be, limited to the supply of Balkan Guerrillas by air and sea transport, to minor raids by Commandos, and to the bombing of strategic objectives.
We shall accelerate our operations against Japan in the Pacific and in Southeast Asia. Our purposes are to exhaust Japanese air, naval, and shipping resources, to cut the Japanese communications and to secure bases from which to bomb Japan proper.
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Document from Franklin D. Roosevelt Library:
Memorandum for the President September 25, 1944, from the Secretary of State
Referring to your memorandum of September 15 from Quebec on the
postwar treatment of Germany which received the agreement of the Prime
Minister and yourself, it occurs to me that several steps should be
considered in connection with the adoption of the policy which will be
carried out in Germany after its surrender or collapse.
It would seem highly advisable to have the firm agreement of
the Governments of Great Britain and the Soviet Union to the policy to
be adopted as we have thus far acted on the basis that every action
followed with respect to Germany, particularly in the post-hostilities
period, would be on an agreed tripartite basis. It has been our
understanding that the Soviet Government has also acted on this general
assumption, and of course the European Advisory Commission, established
by the Moscow Conference, was set up for the purpose of working out the
problems of the treatment of Germany. We must realize that the adoption
of any other basis of procedure would enormously increase the
difficulties and responsibilities not only of our soldiers in the
immediate military occupational period but also of our officials in the
control period following.
Our information up to the present has been to the effect that
the British Government no doubt has ideas of its own with respect to
the application of economic controls to Germany, and we have not yet
had any indication that the British Government would be in favor of
complete eradication of German industrial productive capacity in the
Ruhr and Saar. We have no idea as yet what the Soviet Government has in
mind. Would it not be well at this time for the State Department to
sound out the British and Russian views on the treatment of German
industry either through the European Advisory Commission or otherwise?
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