In September several B-17s were sent to the Philippines and airfields were being built, especially in Luzon. While the Philippines now had priority over Hawaii in receiving war materials and men, stateside bottlenecks in November and December kept them from reaching their destination. Nine vessels could not arrive.
By December 1941, there were about 250 aircraft, mostly on Luzon. But only half of them were ready for combat. Clark Field near Manila had an aircraft warning system and an aircraft artillery regiment. MacArthur planned on having the U.S. forces ready for war by April 1942 and the Philippine Army ready by July 1942. The Asiatic Fleet, commanded by Admiral Thomas C. Hart, had several vessels including one heavy cruiser, the U.S.S. Houston. But the Japanese were very familiar with the Philippines' terrain and defenses since they had informants there for years. "Their only miscalculation was to anticipate that their enemy would make a last stand in Manila instead of withdrawing, as they did, to Bataan, the peninsula west of the capital." (13)
On December 8, those stationed in the Philippines heard about Pearl Harbor. Many there did not believe the news at first. According to Lt. Juanita Redmond, ANC, stationed at Sternberg General Hospital in Manila, "I don't suppose more than a handful of us who gathered in the familiar Army and Navy Club ... ever took seriously the possibility that our jaunty invitations to the Japanese to 'come on and invade us and see what you get' would be accepted." (14) Military personnel and civilians alike were taken off guard. "In all the streets there were crowds-Chinese, Filipinos ... Spaniards, Americans-I didn't see any Japanese-all milling around uncertainly." (15)
At 8 a.m. on December 8, the bombers at Clark Field went on patrol in order not to get caught on the ground. But by 11:30 a.m., all but two returned for lunch and refueling. At noon the Japanese attacked. While the Japanese pilots were spotted by many, Clark Field only received one message, which was mishandled. The result was total devastation. The U.S. could only provide meager resistance. By day's end "the American bombers in the Philippines had been eliminated as a significant striking force." (16)
On December 9, Nichols Field was attacked. Manila Bay and Cavite Navy Base were targeted on the 10th. Submarines were attacked, forcing the fleet's remnants to refuel and get supplies from Corregidor, in accordance with Orange. By December 31, they left for Australia. (17)
Thus, by the end of three weeks of war, Japanese successes included the destruction of American air power, elimination of effective naval operations, important amphibious landings, and the severance of communications with Australia. General Homma was now ready to make his move on Manila. (18)
The Japanese landing troops soon followed.
For the amphibious landings Tokyo had assigned Lieutenant General Masaharu Homma's 14th Japanese Army, consisting of the 16th and 48th Divisions and the 65th Brigade plus supporting units‹in all, about a hundred thousand men, exactly the number the Orange Plan had estimated Japan would use. The total was considerably fewer than MacArthur had, although the Japanese were much better trained, equipped, and led. (19)
Still, MacArthur believed the vast numbers of Filipino reservists could defeat Japan. They consisted of the North Luzon Force (four divisions) commanded by Major General Jonathan M. Wainwright and the South Luzon Force (two divisions) under Brigadier General George M. Parker, Jr. MacArthur "held in reserve his best troops, the U.S. Philippine Division, composed of the 31st American and 45th and 57th Philippine Scout infantry regiments and the 1st Division of Philippine Army regulars. He intended to use them to support either of his beach defense forces as needed." (20)
Despite the events so far, MacArthur still did not believe Japan would launch a full attack until April 1942, when the Filipino troops would be ready. But by mid-December Wainwright realized his troops were not only under trained and under armed, but "they prudently fled at the first sign of the enemy's approach." (21)
On December 22, the Japanese landed at Lingayan Gulf. Manila was soon to be surrounded and MacArthur had no alternative but institute Plan Orange on December 23.
That the Filipino and American forces scattered north and south of Manila managed to retire successfully into Bataan is attributable to MacArthur's sound over-all direction and to skillful field generalship. At MacArthur's order Wainwright's North Luzon Force established a series of defense lines south from Lingayen Gulf, each of which held just long enough to delay the Japanese and enable other units to retire in order into Bataan. In holding these lines a number of units fought hard and well. (22)
While the Japanese realized the Americans and Filipinos were escaping to Bataan, they provided little resistance. On December 26, MacArthur declared Manila an open city in order to save it from more destruction. This did not keep the Japanese from continuing their bombing until January 2, when they arrived in Manila. (23)